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(Indra Kumar Lahoti is a third year student at Hidayatullah National Law University and an Associate Editor of The PCLS Blog.)
Once regarded as a platform for diverse viewpoints, the internet today is doing more harm than good. The recent controversy where social media giant Twitter fact-checked the American President’s tweet has started a fresh debate on the liability of intermediaries with respect to freedom of speech in the online space. This has again re-ignited the broader question of whether the use of the Internet as a platform for ‘communication’ should be regulated and if so, what are the contours of such regulation and who will be the ‘authority’ to decide such restrictions. A significant part of this discussion revolves around the role and liability of intermediaries ranging from online marketplaces and search engines to online payment websites and network service providers. Safe Harbours in Rough Tides Section 79 of the IT Act provides for a safe-harbour to intermediaries for, “any third party information, data, or communication like made available or hosted by him” subject to observing certain ‘due diligence’ guidelines. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“Meity”) issued The Draft Information Technology [Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment) Rules], 2018 (“the Draft Rules”) in 2018 for public comments. This draft was heavily criticized by civil society members, industry, media and online platforms for its vague and overbroad terms. Although these rules were not notified then, reportedly the government is once again considering notifying the same Draft Rules to curb fake news and online sexually explicit content by fixing the liability of intermediaries more strictly. This article will specifically deal with the phrase ‘unlawful content’ which has different connotations and meanings.
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(Srishti Nigam and Snehil Ajmera are second and third year students respectively, at Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur) The whole world is shaken by the outbreak of the pandemic COVID-19 which has put almost every activity on halt. At the outset of such a difficult time, we find that technology is marked as a panacea for each nation. In this difficult time, everyone has started working from home and judiciary is no exception to this. Due to this crisis even they have started functioning virtually by taking up the matters through video conferencing. All of this raises some questions as to the aspect of access to justice, which is a constitutional goal for our country. The words ‘Access to Justice’ immediately stir up in our mind the idea that every person who seeks justice must be provided with the requisite opportunity to approach the Court of Justice. Delivery of justice is essential in dispensing the rights of the citizens whose life-long earnings are exhausted during the pending trials. Some measures have been taken, in this regard, by the courts of our country. The courts will now use virtual-hearing in all matters including bail applications, remands and in criminal trials and civil suits where a witness is located intrastate, interstate, or overseas. Further, there is no bar in examining witnesses by way of virtual-hearings. This paper goes on to analyse these measures.
(Shivi Shrivastava and Vaibhav Singh are third year students at Institute of law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad)
INTRODUCTION Ever Since the inception of the Aarogya Setu app, it has been swarming with controversies and debates. Amidst the grave public health crisis, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 2nd April 2020 launched this application to keep a track of the health status of citizens and for coronavirus case contact tracing. Earlier on 1st May 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs with an objective to augment the number of users issued the guidelines which mandated the use of Aarogya Setu for both public and private employees. But the latest guidelines of 17th May ruled that the private sector employees should on a best effort basis ensure that the application is installed in their phones. The app is still required for train travel, air travel and even most of the government employees. In addition to this, the Jharkhand High Court has passed an order making installation of Aarogya Setu Application a prerequisite condition for granting bail. As the coronavirus positive cases are incessantly proliferating, the government, to protect the people, from the infection has started regulating their movement. There is no end to the gamut of restrictions that can be foisted through this app. The app has induced a miasma of distress as it breaches the privacy of citizens and grossly violates their fundamental right. The application seems to be a benign one but it is crammed with the potential to violate international conventions and principles. The app is invasive from the security and safety point of view as it is silent on the requisite data confidential practices. (Deepanwita Sengupta is a fourth year student at Amity Law School, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi.)
A Brief History Article 16 of the Constitution of India talks about equality of opportunity in the matters concerning public employment. It has been one of the most controversial and contentious issues in our constitutional jurisprudence over the years with various judgments and decisions regarding its validity and appropriate interpretation, along with a slew of amendments and changes in our laws which are associated with it. It came to the fore in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992), where a 9-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that caste-based reservations for promotions in public employment was not desirable. It observed that Article 16(4) grants power to the State to make reservations in appointments or posts in favour of citizens considered to be ‘backward class’ if they are inadequately represented in the State services, but it does not explicitly permit reservations in matter of promotions in public employment. The Court restricted the operation of this judgement to only prospective cases. It also held that if any State or Central service or any other authority believes that to ensure considerable and adequate representation of people categorised as ‘backward class’ of citizens in any service, category, or class and feels it is vital to provide for procedure of direct recruitment therein, it has been granted the permission to do so. Reservation in Promotion The Parliament of India effectively overruled this judgement by inserting Article 16(4A) into the Constitution by the 77th Amendment Act in 1995. It provided for reservation in promotion. However, this provision limits its applicability to only the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, without following any further distinction or differentiation among them. Article 16 (4A) of the Constitution of India categorically states that nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the public services under the authority of the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the view of the State, are not represented in adequate and desirable amount in the services working under the State. Consequential Seniority Consequential seniority is the process when the provision of seniority in the public services are seen as a foreseeable consequence of the promotions which are granted to the people belonging to the SC/ST categories under the State services which were granted to them through policies such as reservations. The process of consequential seniority allows the candidates belonging to the reserved category to retain their seniority over their general category counterparts. When the reserved category candidate is promoted before the candidate belonging to the general category because of the policy of reservation in promotion, then for the subsequent promotion in the future the reserved candidate would retain the seniority. [i] In Union of India And Ors. V Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995) the Apex court stated that the judgment in the Indra Sawhney spoke for itself and while the rule of reservation can give certain accelerated promotion, it does not impart consequential seniority simultaneously. It is pertinent to note that this judgement was delivered in October of that year – after the 77th Amendment – and the Court acknowledged the same but refused to express an opinion on it. The Court also highlighted that the candidate who was promoted earlier by the applicability of rule of reservation is not entitled to consequential seniority over his senior just because of the special circumstances and that when a general candidate who was initially senior to him in the lower category shall be promoted, such general candidate will regain his seniority over the given reserved candidate notwithstanding that he was promoted subsequently to the given reserved candidate. This principle which came to be known as the 'catch-up rule' was reiterated in Ajit Singh Januja & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Ors (1996) which allowed the general category candidates to catch-up to their reserved category peers. It was held that consequential seniority is a consequence of reservation in promotion and not an additional benefit and also elaborated on the creamy layer test, which could only be applied at the stage of reservation in promotion and not subsequently in the case of consequential seniority. In effect, consequential seniority undoes the catch-up rule and the Supreme Court was not convinced of its constitutionality. With the 85th Amendment Act in 2001, the Parliament included the term ‘consequential seniority’ in Article 16(4A). In cases where promotion had been granted in lieu of rule of reservation, the amendment had a retrospective effect as it was to be considered in effect from June 17, 1995, the same date on which “reservation in promotion” was included by the 77th Constitution Amendment. The constitutional validity of 77th and 85th Constitutional Amendments were challenged before a 5-judge Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj v. UOI (2006). In this case the SC upheld the validity of Article 16(4A) as merely being an enabling provision and that the State is not bound to make reservation for SCs/STs in matters of promotions. The Constitution Bench also analysed and perused whether the replacement of the earlier decided catch-up rule with consequential seniority violated the basic structure and equality principle guaranteed under the Constitution. The Court finally reached a decision and held that the catch-up rule and consequential seniority are two different judicially evolved concepts based on the country’s service jurisprudence and held that both are not implied in the clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16, as they are based on practices and not constitutional principles which are beyond the Parliament’s amending power. Hence, the exercise of the enabling power under Article 16 (4A) was held not to violate the basic features of the Constitution. The five judge bench went ahead and added a few more conditions or factors to the article, and decided that only when these conditions are satisfied by the state it will get the authorisation to provide for reservations in promotions for SC/ST. These vital conditions were, quantifiable data regarding backwardness, inadequacy of representation in public services in addition to compliance with Article 335, and no impact on the overall efficiency of administration of the state by way of such a reservation. It also specified that the State will have to see that its policy does not lead to excessiveness which shall breach the ceiling limit of 50%, removes the creamy layer and in no way extends the reservation indefinitely. These necessary conditions were known to be referred as the “compelling factors”. In the case of S. Panneer Selvam v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2015), the Division Bench of the Apex Court held that the consequential seniority for reserved category promotions can be fixed as long as there is an explicit and express provision for such reserved category promotions and not in absence of such provisions in the State rules. In the absence of any such provision or policy there will be no automatic application of Article 16-4A of the Constitution. Moreover, the State would be duty bound to collect the appropriate data so as to assess the adequacy of representation of the Scheduled Caste candidates in the service and based on the same finding the State should frame a policy/rules for consequential seniority. The condition of producing quantifiable data to prove the “backwardness” and for granting reservation in promotion to SC/ST was questioned again in the case of Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018). The Supreme Court’s five judge bench came up with the important decision and held that there was no explicit need to provide data for assessing the backwardness of the SC/ST community in the state as they are already presumed to be backward in our society. However, stressing on M Nagaraj, the SC stated that a State which wants to grant reservation in promotions as per under Article 16(4A) will have to conduct a survey or study bringing close attention to the inadequacy of representation of SC/STs which is prevalent in their respective public services, while simultaneously maintaining the overall efficiency of the State administration. The Current Status of Consequential Seniority In B K Pavitra v Union of India - I, the Apex Court struck down the The Karnataka Determination of Seniority of the Government Servants Promoted on the Basis of Reservation (To the Posts in the Civil Services of the State) Act, 2002 (“2002 Act”) as the State of Karnataka provided for the process of consequential seniority applicable to the promotees based on the length of their service in their respective cadres but, consequently failed to provide any compelling evidence which justified the consequential seniority policy applicable in the state. After the Supreme Court struck down the 2002 Act, the State created the Ratna Prabha Committee to submit a quantitative report which were to demonstrate the three compelling factors behind the enactment of the 2017 Act, these were:
In BK Pavitra v. Union of India – II (2019), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 2017 Act that had re-introduced consequential seniority for SC/STs in Karnataka’s public employment. The Bench held that the decision and opinion of the government relating to the appropriate adequacy of representation of the SCs and STs needs to be assessed with proper reference to the benchmark that has been unanimously decided through previous judgments on adequacy and it is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the government about how it decides the representation through reservation in matters of public employment and services. The Court conducted an in-depth analysis and studied the data provided by the State demonstrating backwardness, inadequate representation and administrative efficiency and went on to clarify that the Court's power of judicial review was limited in its approach, while simultaneously observing that the importance and need for reservation lies within the purview and domain of the executive and legislature of the state. While defining the concept of ‘representative notion of efficiency’ the court stated that the backward class of citizens in our country cannot be specifically identified only and exclusively with the reference to an economic criteria and that a meritorious candidate is not just the one who is more talented or gifted, but the one on whose appointment, the state fulfils its responsibility and upholds the constitutional goal of uplifting the downtrodden and backward SC/STs. The Bench concluded that this representative notion of efficiency is congruent with the policy of consequential seniority. The court decided that the data that was submitted by the state based on the report was just and acceptable and hence decided to uphold the validity of the 2017 Act. The judgment delivered by another Division Bench of the Apex Court earlier this year in Mukesh Kumar vs The State Of Uttarakhand (2020) appears to ring-fence the liberal and expansive approach taken in B K Pavitra II judgement. In that case, the Court had validated Karnataka’s 2017 Act despite criticism that the exercise carried out by the Ratna Prabha Committee was designed in a way to make the conclusion inevitable. In other words, the Court threw its weight behind a state government which wants to provide consequential seniority in promotions. However, in Mukesh Kumar, the Court held that State Governments are not bound to provide reservations if they decide not to do the same and they are not required to justify their actions by providing quantifiable data and decided that even if there is under representation, the court cannot issue a mandamus directing the State to provide reservation. Conclusion The Apex Court’s stance on reservation in promotion has been varying in different cases as we have seen from Indra Sawhney to BK Pavitra II, with one rejecting the notion of reservation in promotion completely holding it to be violative of constitutional principles and the other upholding the concept of consequential seniority with specific attention given to the court’s interpretation of representative notion of efficiency. But the one line of thought that has always been similar in all these judgments is the special power and authority given to the state to make criteria and policies for reservation in promotion based on each state’s demographic and representation, which meets the needs of the state while being in agreement with our constitutional goals. - Deepanwita Sengupta [i] Kunika and Kuljeevan Sidharth, ‘The Issue of Reservation as Article 16(4A) – Arbitrary or Mandatory?’( The Citizen, 12 June 2020), https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/9/18733/The-Issue-of-Reservation-as-Article-164A--Arbitrary-or-Mandatory. (Anindita Deb is a fifth year student at University Law College, Gauhati University, Guwahati.) "In my considered opinion, right to privacy of any individual is essentially a natural right, which inheres in every human being by birth. Such right remains with the human being till he/she breathes last. It is indeed inseparable and inalienable from human beings. In other words, it is born with the human being and extinguishes with human being.” - Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre in his separate judgement in the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India The grimness of the situation of a world stalked by a deadly virus can be estimated by the fact that dark clouds of death and uncertainty now loom over the race that has even managed to set foot in space. In the background of crumbling world order and a quest for the discovery of a cure, this article attempts to discuss the growing privacy concerns in the era of a pandemic.
Demystifying privacy challenges With the practice of social distancing becoming the new normalcy, digital platforms are the new heroes in the business. The government of India, leaving no stones unturned, has added several such digital platforms in its arsenal of weapons against the deadly coronavirus These apps have multifaceted functions from tracing infected patients to identifying COVID-19 hotspots. The Aarogya Setu App, for instance, uses GPS and Bluetooth facilities to keep a record of all the places the device has been at a 15-minute interval and of all other Aarogya Setu App users it detected nearby. The App also proactively informs users about the practices for restricting the spread of the virus. This undoubtedly eases the burden off the shoulders of the health care system and enables the detection of infected patients but the consequence of such unrestricted data gathering can be grave. Privacy concerns have been raised by experts. A French ethical hacker has also flagged security issues with the app. The seriousness of the situation is further accentuated when third parties or private entities participate in the process of data collection. Google has recently released ‘Community Mobility Reports’ which provides an insight into the movement pattern of its users during the pandemic. While the data remains anonymous, it does not mitigate the concern of data exploitation. Voicing a similar apprehension, an international digital rights group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), raised privacy concerns about a Coronavirus screening website made by Verily concerning how the data collected by it will be used. Embarking on the digital route, the Kerala administration has also tied up with an IT startup called Sprinklr for COVID-19 management. Reportedly, the app has scarce experience in data collection and monitoring a pandemic and is now a treasure trove of crucial health data of many Keralites. Several other methods for containing the menace of the deadly Coronavirus are also being used. The Karnataka Health Department, the Rajasthan government and the Mohali Administration have revealed the details of the people in quarantine and the ones suspected of carrying the virus respectively. The information revealed is sufficient enough to have a pernicious impact on the privacy and mental health of these individuals, keeping in mind the societal stigma surrounding the ailment. Similarly in Delhi, posters starting with ‘COVID-19: Do not visit. Home under quarantine’ have been glued outside the houses of the suspects revealing their details. Noble intentions can never be used by the executive as a veil for concealing abdication of responsibilities of safeguarding the mental health and privacy of the citizenry. Such ill-judged actions have resulted in the creation of a situation where ‘naming and shaming’ is the norm; this is in a world that is already grappling with a deadly disease. The Test The Supreme Court’s verdict in Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs. Union Of India heralds a new age of data protection and privacy. The right to privacy was added to the ever-expansive body of laws entrenched in Article 21 of the constitution. The judgment evolves a three-fold test to test the reasonableness of a restriction imposed on privacy. For the restriction to be reasonable, it should be (i) legal, (ii) proportional to the object sought to be achieved by the law, and (iii) it should have a legitimate aim. In the middle of the coronavirus nightmare, concerns of privacy may seem to be a luxury of the privileged but any action taken in the divergence of the threefold test may serve the purpose of becoming a dangerous precedent and ushering in an age of arbitrary state actions. On first blush, it may seem that the issue of the legality of actions can be resolved by relying on The Disaster Management Act,2005 and The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 but on a closer look, it can be found that none of these enactments grant legitimacy to collect and disseminate information in the manner it has been done. The activity of publishing the details of individuals consists of the following steps-a) collection of information b) preparation of a list containing the information c) publishing the list. None of these activities have been mentioned or sanctioned under the Acts and are being carried on an ad-hoc basis. It may be argued that Section 6 of The Disaster Management Act, 2005 and Section 2(1) of The Epidemic Diseases Act,1897 impart a legal bedrock on which the aforementioned activities are being undertaken but these provisions do not provide a mechanism for data collection and dissemination. As such it would be no exaggeration to state that these executive actions have no legal validity. Reportedly, such action of collection and disseminating of information has birthed an increase in morbidity and mortality rates since many have shied away from visiting hospitals. Concerning the issue of proportionality of the restriction to the object sought, it is pertinent to note that Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 in clause 12 enlists medical emergency as one of the grounds on which personal data can be processed without the consent of the person. The presence of this provision in the bill, however, does not grant an exemption to the executive with regards to purpose limitation, lawful processing, storage limitation, transparency, and accountability. Clauses 4,5,6 and 9 of the bill clearly highlight the principles of lawful processing, purpose limitation, limit on collection of personal data, limit on data retention respectively. The government may therefore, process data for the purpose of safeguarding the life and health of the public but the data has to be removed once the purpose has been fulfilled. The activities of the government fail to achieve validity when tested on the furnace of proportionality. Data collection and storage by the executive in a nation that is in a privacy law vacuum is nothing but an unbridled exercise of power with no safeguards to regulate the process. This also begs the question of ‘least restrictive measure’ The principle of ‘least restrictive measure’ requires a least intrusive but an equally effacious measure. In the presence of equally effacious and less restrictive measures like inspection visits, video calls, surprise visits, the collection and dissemination of personal information leading to a breach of privacy seems to contradict the requirement of ‘least restrictive measure’ . It appears to be an illustration of the phrase ‘using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.’ The activities of revealing the details of individuals based on mere conjecture, that refraining from doing so would result in the breach of either the quarantine restrictions or the restrictions imposed on a Covid-19 suspected patient, appears inordinate when juxtaposed with the ostracizing that the individual might have to experience as a result of such actions. The third test laid down by the Puttaswamy judgment is that of a legitimate aim. It can be assumed that in the face of an unprecedented event like that of the coronavirus pandemic, personal data collection in public interest is the need of the hour. However, public interest as a legitimate aim would still be nugatory in granting legitimacy to governmental actions on account of lack of legality and proportionality. Resolving the quandary It is pertinent to state that activities of data collection and dissemination are presently unfounded in law since the Data Protection Bill, 2019 is yet to become an Act. In order to give it a legitimate foundation, it is essential that all activities of data collection, processing, and dissemination are undertaken on the bedrock of due process incorporated in law. With the entry of private players in the digital platforms, strict surveillance and monitoring should be maintained on the behest of the government to prevent the exploitation of data. In the current circumstances, it may appear that revealing the names and details of COVID-19 suspected individuals or quarantined individuals may serve the purpose of deterrence but this assumption appears to be short-lived when the situation is viewed from the perspective of an individual who runs the risk of being ostracized by the society he lives in. The knee jerk reaction of such an individual would be to evade the process of reporting. The object of the state could be met by maintaining an anonymous graphic representation of patients, sticking posters of caution in the locality of quarantined or suspected COVID-19 individuals, frequent video calls, surprise checks, and inspection visits along with strict punitive measures for breach of laws. These measures will serve the object of the government without serving the names and details of individuals on a platter. Conclusion It will not be erroneous to state that the world is going through a dark time and the government has gone the extra mile by enforcing stringent lockdown and social distancing norms along with the creation of quarantine facilities to pave way for a brighter and healthier future. Inter arma silent leges is a latin phrase which roughly translates to – In times of war, the laws fall silent, but in the Indian context, the supreme law of the land should not fall silent even in times of a war against an invisible enemy A pandemic cannot be used to abnegate a right that is embedded in the very being of an individual. While a lot has been done by the judiciary for the safekeeping of privacy, it must be ensured that the principles of privacy do not remain merely in black and white but translate into a reality. (Nikunj Maheshwari and Kapil Shrivastava are 4th and 3rd year students respectively, at Institute of law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad)
COVID-19 pandemic has come as a Pandora box, where on one hand it has transpired loopholes in systems and mechanisms created by humans, and on the other hand, it has proved the importance of virtual connectivity for the progress of the humankind. With incessant growth of online content sharing platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and Tiktok, to name a few, as well as the number of users using these platforms, concerns pertaining to the content shared on these platforms have also ratcheted. One such incident that has again brought this perennial concern to limelight is a video created by a Tiktok user which allegedly promoted acid attacks on women. When this video surfaced over the internet National Commission for Women lodged a complaint against the video creator. While in this case a legal action was taken, a plethora of other sordid videos promoting violence, sexual abuse, and homophobic content receive umpteen amounts of views on a regular basis but escape the clutches of the authorities. This results in serious harm to the mentality of young viewers and as a sequitur promotes sinister thoughts among the users. Judicial opinion and exigency for regulation Multiple High Courts have opined how objectionable videos and content on unregulated platforms like Tiktok are causing harm to society. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, in the year 2019 issued an interim order in the judgement of S Muthukumar v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and while taking an austere stance, banned the download of the Tiktok application along with circulation of videos created through it on other platforms. The court noted that – “From the above arguments, this Court expresses a serious concern over the possibility of women and children of our country being sexually abused by video sharing and some predators are exploiting the innocent victims. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 6 and 9 has agreed with the same and submitted that the Government should be keen in taking appropriate action in the larger public interest” The Orissa High Court also commenting on the same issue in a recent judgement of Shibani Barik v. State of Orissa noted that “Tiktok Mobile App which often demonstrates a degrading culture and encourages pornography besides causing pedophiles and explicit disturbing content, is required to be properly regulated so as to save the teens from its negative impact. The appropriate Government has got the social responsibility to put some fair regulatory burden on those companies which are proliferating such applications”. The High Court in the same judgement further went on to comment that “sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which prohibits and punishes publication and circulation of obscene or lascivious content are grossly insufficient” to tackle the situation. As it is the duty of the intermediary to moderate the content, some of the platforms have in this direction increased the use of automatic flagging and human moderators to keep a check on the quality of the content. However other platforms like Tiktok have miserably failed to ensure the same. This has raised not only concerns but also demand for a law or a set of regulation to manage this growing menace. In India it is not the case that no regulations have been formulated by the government. In the year 2019, when the same issue arose before the Supreme Court, the Government responded by stating that they will notify The Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment) Rules, 2018 ( from now onward, the rules) by January 2020, which has not yet been done. The authors in this post will argue the necessity to notify laws and will endeavor to critique the proposed law in light of fundamental rights by taking into account multiple incidents, judicial precedents and international jurisprudence. Shredding the Fabric of Fundamental Rights In a law regulating online content the primary concern that arises is what will be its insinuations on the fundamental human rights? Global standards have identified that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online. By virtue of this, it can be held that any law that does not comply with fundamental rights guaranteed in constitution they should be held as unconstitutional. In this context, protection of three fundamental rights emerges. Firstly, protection of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). Secondly, right to privacy under Article 21, and Lastly protection of the rights to do business under article 19(1)(g).
Regulation 3 of the Rules asks online platforms to not display or publish certain category of information and to further use Artificial Intelligence to manage ‘unlawful information and content’. In this regulation multiple words and phrases for instance 'unlawful information or content', ‘otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever’, ‘blasphemous’ or ‘public order’ are not defined. With no definitions and clarity provided, the artificial intelligence and human moderators run the risk of identifying false negatives and false positives, because of which they may end up deleting lawful content, assuming it to be unlawful. Thus because of great arbitrariness, ambiguity and vagueness involved in the law, it has great potential to harm the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), and to misused by government to shun any kind of dissent.
However, the proposed law seems to be contrary to it. In the opinion of the author, right to privacy includes privacy from the government. Clause 3 of the rules obligates the online platforms to compulsorily share the information with the government when it asks for. With no checks and balance provided, the present law is not ‘privacy neutral’ and can be misused by the government to suppress voices of whistle blowers in the facade of regulating online content. Thus, it is pertinent for the Government to introduce regulations that are more ‘privacy neutral’ and actually attempts to solve the problem.
Thus, while framing regulation, the government will have to keep in mind that such harsh steps are saved for only exceptional circumstances. International view France has recently enacted a law to curb offensive content. It directs online platforms to pull down contents of racist, sexist etc nature, within 24 hours otherwise fine will be levied. Network Enforcement Act, in Germany, on the other hand, provides strict take-down timeline for hate speech with some relaxation if some necessary facts are to be determined for the reliability of the information. French law has been heavily criticised on the grounds, that firstly, 24 hours is an extremely short span of time to make conclusions about ‘hate speech’, which is an intrinsically circumstantial, fact-specific, area of law, and secondly, complete burden and liability, on the online platforms may push them to take down lawful content citing hate speech. Whereas German law tries to take all these challenges and perspectives into account and then imposes any punishment on the online platforms. For India, we must attempt to follow the German model, instead of becoming prey to the French one, as it will help us to fix liability on the true assailant and will also maintain healthy market for online platform companies. Conclusion It is evident that social media can cause great menace, so much so to provoke a person to commit suicide. Nonetheless, in democratic country like India, regulations of any nature need to be framed after balancing the fundamental rights of the citizens and cause in hand. Therefore, it is suggested by the author that the need of the hour is the law, which appropriately optimizes to balance all concerns i.e., a combination of legal provisions and self-regulation (by apps and their users) coupled with the tag of accountability. For this purpose, the legislature should borrow certain principles and practices from the German model and attempt to address real issue of regulating content instead of restricting freedom of speech under the facade of regulating online content. (Mohit Kar is a fourth year student at Maharashtra National Law University, Aurangabad.)
Introduction After years of lobbying from media houses and international pressure, the Indian Parliament amended the Copyright Act, 1957 in 2012. It was done with the primary intent of bringing the Indian Copyright provisions up-to-date with the current technological advancements and to make it compliant with international treaties such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The amendment inserted Section 31(D) which allowed radio and television broadcasters to seek a statutory license for communicating to the public any previously-published musical work, literary work or sound recording. The amendment was welcomed as providing a helping hand to the Indian radio industry that was crumbling under the strain of exorbitant license fees demanded by record labels.[1] A wave of criticism ensued when the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP”) issued an office memorandum dated 05 September 2016 (“OM”) clarifying that ‘internet broadcasting’ would be considered as communication to the public under Section31 (D). Subsequently, multiple petitions were filed before different High Courts and the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the provision as well as the OM, especially with regards to Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.[2] These matters remain pending before the Supreme Court. In this post, the author will analyze the challenges to Section 31(D)to examine whether it would pass the test of constitutionality. The Challenges to Section 31 D’s Constitutionality The primary constitutional issue with regards to this section pertains to its violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It has been argued that the provision negates equality by granting statutory licensing only to literary works, musical works and sound recordings but not other forms of copyrighted works such as dramatic works and cinematographic films.[3] This contention seems vague because the amendment was made as an enabling provision to allow the general public access to sound recordings. The primary intent of introducing a statutory licensing regime to the musical and sound recordings was to curb the high licensing fees that were being demanded by owners of sound recordings/musical works and enable easier and faster access to them (given the large of number of sound recordings that are produced in India) for the broadcasters as well as the general public. A possible explanation for the provision not being extended to dramatic and cinematographic works could be that the number of cinematographic movies that are produced are significantly lesser in number compared to sound recordings/musical works. Secondly, it is preferable if each cinematographic film is licensed individually keeping in mind the production cost so that it is fair to producers. The status quo enables them to be compensated fairly. Extending statutory licensing onto movies would have been an unnecessary change to a system that is working well. Further, Section 31D does not intend to give any special rights to broadcasters such as free, unlimited access to copyrighted literary works, musical works sound recordings. Rather, it enables the copyrighted literary works, musical works and sound recordings to be broadcasted to a larger audience after the payment of a fixed price to copyright societies. In this way the provision intends to strike a balance between public interest and private interest and there is no negation of equality as other forms of copyrighted works can be broadcast as per the usual procedure of licensing under Section 30 of the Copyright Act. Thus, the provision would pass the test of arbitrariness laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Ajay Hasia. Accordingly, Section 31D does not appear to violate any tenets of Article 14. The debate around Section 31D arose again after the OM was issued by the DIPP. The use of the word “any broadcasters” in Section 31D by the Legislature clarifies its intent to restrict the classes of broadcasters to radio and television organizations rather than modes of broadcast such as internet. This can be further pointed by going through the intricacies of Section 31D (3), and Rules 29(3), 29(4)(b), 29(4)(g), 29(4)(h) of the Copyright Rules, 1958 wherein there is an explicit mention of radio and television broadcasting with no mention of internet broadcasting. It is evident that the OM was not well thought out by the DIPP. The Bombay High Court struck it down in Tips Industries Ltd v Wynk Ltd on the ground that it lacked ‘statutory flavour’. The Court reasoned that the absence of express words in Section 31-D providing for a Statutory License in respect of internet streaming and/or downloading, was a conscious legislative decision and should be adhered to. The other prominent constitutional issue pertains to the rights of the owners of copyright under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It guarantees the right to practice any profession or carry out any occupation, trade, or business, subject to reasonable restrictions laid down in Article 19(2) and further expanded upon in Article 19(6). In the present scenario, the legislative intent of Section 31(D) was to support the radio industry in India. The radio industry was going through a tough phase because it had no access to licensed works at reasonable rates.[4] The broadcasters were also lacking sufficient engagement to rake in the lucrative sponsorships and advertisements. Now, with the help of this provision the radio broadcasters could get access to protected works by paying a fair amount of compensation which would be fixed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board. Thus, the provision would pass the constitutional test of “reasonable restriction” specifically with respect to freedom of trade as laid down by the Supreme Court in Laxmi Khandsari v State of UP, since it was enacted keeping in mind public policy and the rights of public-at-large at the time. Conclusion The principal goal of copyright law is to strike a balance between the interests of the copyright owner and the general public who get to experience it. It aims to promote creativity and incentivize authorship by giving due compensation to the authors in order to maximize public engagement and benefits. The other stakeholders in the industry play a secondary role. But with the advent of commercialization of intellectual property, copyright holders such as record labels have come to the forefront of the market. The labels try to exert their copyrights in a way that is pernicious to the interests of both the authors and the public at large. But provisions like statutory licensing aim to address this issue by acting as a deterrent to the monopoly created by the record labels. Their aim is to set fair and equitable prices for licenses which would act in favor of not only the broadcasting organizations but also the authors and the public-at-large. Hence, the statute should be held constitutionally valid to act as a precedent for future amendments to the Indian copyright law that attempt to strike a balance between the rights accorded to owners of the copyright and the broadcasters. - Mohit Kar [1]Zakir Thomas, Overview of Changes to the Indian Copyright Law, 17 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 329 (2012). [2]M/s Lahari Recording Company v Union of India (W.P. (C) 667/2018); Eskay Video Pvt. Ltd. v Union of India (W.P. 14979 (W)/2016); South Indian Music Companies vs Union Of India (W.P. 6604 (M)/2015). [3]Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. and Anr. v Union of India (W.P (C) 2316/2013) [4] NDA Hotline, Fm Radio - Royalties Reduced to Global Standards, NISITH DESAI ASSOCIATES, (Apr. 17 2020), http://www.nishithdesai.com/information/research-and-articles/nda-hotline/nda-hotline-single-view/article/fm-radio-ndash-royalties-reduced-to-globalstandards.html?no_cache=1&cHash=1701dc615585e57659b0064315012d19. (Shashwat Singh is a first year student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad).
Introduction India has seen a dramatic shift from the traditional classroom to the online mode of learning amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Private institutions have stepped up their game by conducting online classes on a regular basis while public institutions are trying to align themselves to this new pedagogy and create a level playing field for their students. Apart from the universities turning to online platforms like Zoom and Google Meet to conduct live classes; the MHRD has initiated eighty two undergraduate non-engineering Massive Online Open Courses on its SWAYAM platform in order to reach out to a bigger audience and heavily bring down the costs incurred by the students in the education sector. The Ministry of Human Resource Development (‘MHRD’) and the University Grants Commission (‘UGC’) have released extensive guidelines on the online conduct of classes and seem to be greatly enthusiastic about this new culture of learning which many believe will be the new normal in the post COVID-19 world. However, what many fail to realize is that online education comes with a huge disparity in terms of starting point for the students from disadvantaged backgrounds who the author believes are the primary stakeholders. What confronts the status quo? Access to education for all comes under the wide ambit of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution and should be prioritized while framing any public policy. However, only 8% households in India with members aged between five and twenty-four have access to a computer and an internet connection. It is a forgone conclusion that this digital exclusion disproportionately affects students from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically Weaker Sections. The Kerala High Court upheld the Right to Internet in its 2019 judgement in Faheema Shirin R.K v. State of Kerala. Relying on resolutions passed by the United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations General Assembly, it noted that there was no domestic law in this respect. It further based its rationale on the Supreme Court decision in Vishaka v Rajasthan where it was held that international conventions and resolutions could be read into fundamental rights in the absence of domestic law or inconsistencies. The Kerala HC held that the “right to have access to the internet is a part of the right to education as well as the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”. Currently, differently-abled students are also left behind due to unavailability of extensive online learning modules in Indian Sign Language. Furthermore, access to internet comes at an exorbitant cost; and not everyone has the access to high speed Wi-Fi at home. Add to it, the safety concerns that online learning raises in terms of unauthorized entries and lack of digital literacy amongst the students and teachers alike. Despite concerns raised by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the use of Zoom, colleges across the country have continued its usage as a meeting platform, thus, subjecting students to the possibility of unethical hacking and aggravated data privacy concerns. Privacy, including informational privacy, is intrinsic to right to life under Article 21. In K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India unanimously held that right to privacy is a fundamental right and integral to the freedoms guaranteed under Part III of the Indian Constitution. Education is an entry in the Concurrent List of the Schedule VII and, therefore, a shared responsibility of the Union and the states. State institutions offering education in vernacular languages are the worst hit due to dearth of translated content on online digital repositories. The Draft National Education Policy (‘NEP’) 2019 highlights the dire need to set up special cells for translating “educational materials from the state language to English and vice-versa.” It would be reasonable to assume that students already marginalized due to their social or economic status are facing aggravated uncertainty now that education has moved online. Historical Role of Traditional Classrooms Dr. Ambedkar was a firm believer in the role of colleges in educating and uniting dalits for a struggle against the casteism that pervaded the Indian society and to champion the cause of Dalit emancipation. He was a source of inspiration for the educated men and women who spearheaded the Dalit Panther Movement in 1972. Affirmative action, as enshrined under Article 16 of the Indian Constitution, is about bringing the marginalized communities to the mainstream narrative and online education does the opposite of that because of the differential access to resources as outlined above. The brick-and-mortar classrooms become critical not because of the physical space they offer to the students but due to the mental space which allows students to pose unique questions at their professors. Noted historian Prof. Rudrangshu Mukherjee, Chancellor at Ashoka University, remarked in an interview that he found students asking fewer questions online. Lack of sufficient eye contact, distractions of home environment, and diminished motivation in students contribute to such behavioral patterns. Traditional classrooms versus Online classrooms Unlike online classrooms, traditional classrooms offer the unique opportunity of ‘unlearning’ to the students in terms of gaining from each other’s lived experiences and breaking biases and pre-conceived notions about other communities. Colleges in India include students from varied caste, cultural, religious and economic backgrounds. In order to create an inclusive system, reservation as a form of ‘positive discrimination’ is offered to the students from less privileged backgrounds. This in itself is a testimony to the fact that colleges are conceptualized a ‘melting pot’ for the students from varied backgrounds. Despite all these efforts, absence of a safe space continues to elude students from under privileged communities. Abhishek Asha Kumar, a student at the National Law School of India University who belongs to a scheduled caste (‘SC’), has poignantly written about law schools serving to reinforce the casteist notions that exist outside the school. He has recounted how a constant volley of demeaning remarks such as "Dude, how do these SCs come into this college?" only served to aggravate his mental agony. It is at times like these that a professor’s role in offering a safe space for catharsis to the victimized students and in creating empathetic students comes into picture. On the other hand, online higher education only reinforces the elitism that is prevalent in Indian colleges, and someone like Dr. B.R Ambedkar would have been the first to criticize it. The UGC has made extensive recommendations to the higher universities for addressing caste-based discrimination and monitoring the performance of such students. Online higher education does quite the contrary; it makes the disadvantaged students feel ill-treated by removing them from the mainstream narrative and consequently taking away their right to a dignified life as cherished under Article 21 of the Constitution. By limiting student discourse to an elite group of students, it adversely affects disadvantaged students’ ability to pitch their voice academically and compete with their peers; henceforth, a violation of their fundamental right to free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). Furthermore, Article 46 of the Constitution directs the state to promote educational and economic interests of SCs, STs, and other weaker sections. This is a pressing reality for government to realize and cautiously deal with before full-fledged inclusion of online higher education in any forthcoming education policy. Online learning essentially creates a pitfall for the marginalized students. In the name of providing access to a massive audience, students from disadvantaged backgrounds have to undergo a transition from being vulnerable to being invisible. What can be done? There is an urgency to come up with a comprehensive online pedagogy which the teachers can adhere to while imparting online education. Currently, while some teachers conduct classes on digital platforms like Zoom and Google Meet, others share podcasts with their students, still others resort to creating power point presentations and sharing online reading material. Lack of a Standard Operating Procedure (‘SOP’) has contributed to the same. Also, imparting digital literacy to the teachers is the need of the hour so that those who are uncomfortable with the use of technology may not be left behind. On similar lines, the Draft NEP emphasizes the need of online teacher development modules for the Continuous Professional Development (‘CPD’) of teachers and effectively bolster online education. While telecom operators like Orange and Vodafone are providing free internet services for distance education in African countries, such practices could be extended to India to reach out to the students in the remote parts of the country. In order to bridge the great disparity that exists in terms of accessibility, alternatives like use of community radio and television broadcasts for educational purposes can be adequately utilized. The current situation is marked by mental instability and inability to concentrate; therefore, addressing the psychological concerns of teachers and students is paramount to creating sufficient motivation in them to teach and learn. Conclusion Online learning can at best complement classroom learning; it can never be its substitute. Undoubtedly, it has its own benefits in terms of lower infrastructure and economic costs for the government, but the role of human interaction in developing holistic individuals cannot be denied. Higher education should be all-encompassing in nature. It should not become the illusionary ‘blue eyes’ which the character of Pecola Breedlove in Toni Morrison’s ‘The Bluest Eye’ so longed for that it led to her experiencing ‘racial self-loathing’. Thereby, it becomes paramount for the government to come up with a sustainable SOP for online higher education aimed at the primary stakeholders-- the under privileged students. - Shashwat Singh (Snehil Ajmera and Garvish Jain are third year students from Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur)
Due to the outbreak of the pandemic COVID-19, the world has come to an unexpected halt. As the researchers and scientists failed to develop any vaccine for this health catastrophe until today, ‘social distancing’ is considered the best possible way to contain the spread of the disease. Technology evolved as a panacea in this tough time of COVID-19 when almost all-sectors like the judiciary, education, health, and many more are functioning with the help of internet. Access to the Internet seems to be an ordinary thing in today’s era, but it does not seem so when it comes to Kashmir. Recently, the Supreme Court of India in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India[i] has recognized that the internet shutdown violates freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and freedom to trade and profession under Article 19(1)(g). Accordingly, only the 2G services of the Internet were restored in the Union Territory of J&K by the central government. At a time when the world is suffering from the mar of a treacherous virus, the benefits of 4G services are commendable. In the light of recent Supreme Court Judgment, this blog sheds light on violation of multiple Fundamental Rights. Restoring 4G Services and COVID-19 Recently, the Supreme Court in Foundation of Media Professionals v. Union Territory of J&K[ii] has given a judgment on the issue of restoration of 4G internet services during pandemic COVID-19 and addressed the critical issue of security of the nation and human rights. The court constituted a special committee for balancing the human rights of Kashmir’s citizens with the security of the nation. While it is necessary to check the cross-border terrorism for National security, it must also be kept in mind that this should not result in the violation of Fundamental Rights. The state has justified internet shutdown by claiming that it is curbing terrorism in the area but even after complete restrictions on the internet for six months, authorities have failed to stop insurgent activities in Kashmir. The gross violations of Fundamental Rights due to restricting internet services during COVID-19 are briefly discussed: · Right of Access to Health Services The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla[iii] held that the right to health is integral to the right to life, and the government has a constitutional obligation to provide health facilities. Amid this pandemic, to practice social distancing and curb the spread of the virus, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has recognized the usage of telemedicine and came up with the Telemedicine Practice Guidelines, 2020[iv] which enabled the Registered Medical Practitioner to deliver health-care services by using information and communication technologies to promote social distancing and to reduce the number of patients coming to hospitals. But in Kashmir, due to the restriction of 4G services, it has become impossible for the natives to consult a doctor using video-conferencing or telemedicine. It is important to disseminate correct information about COVID-19 to keep growing anxieties in check and to enable ordinary citizens to make informed choices about their health. It is high time for the center to restore peace in the valley. · Right to Education Students in Kashmir face one hitch after another, firstly, on the event of the abrogation of Article 370, which resulted in complete lockdown in Union Territory for nearly six months and secondly due to the outbreak of COVID-19, both of which ultimately collapsed the education mechanism in the whole UT for about a year. It is true that the pandemic has severely hit the education system throughout the country. However, to salvage academic activities, while education institutes in the rest of the country are resorting to e-learning to impart education to students, Kashmir is lagging way behind on such measures. This is mainly due to the non-availability of high-speed Internet in the area. The right to education is guaranteed under Article 21A of the Constitution. Curtailing internet speed directly affects the students of Kashmir as they are unable to attend online classes, and students appearing for competitive exams are also unable to prepare. While UGC and MHRD have instructed[v] institutes to adopt online means to every possible extent to teach, Kashmir is still struggling for a stable network connection. Remote learning is the way to contain the spread of COVID-19 and also to stabilize the distorted education system, but the speed of the Internet acts as a barrier for Kashmiri students. This directly violates the students’ fundamental Right to Education. The author would submit that this act of restricting internet speed also violates the rights given under Article 14 of the students of Kashmir as there exists an unreasonable classification when the internet services for the students in Kashmir are differentiated from those for the rest of students outside Kashmir. · Access to Justice The words ‘Access to Justice’ immediately stir up in our mind the idea that every person who seeks justice must be provided with the requisite opportunity to approach the Court of Law. A constitutional bench of the Apex Court in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan[vi] has held that access to justice is a Fundamental Right guaranteed to citizens under Article 14 and Article 21. During COVID-19, human life is clogged and has become stagnant, so have the courts. Many courts have started to function virtually, and they have succeeded to a great extent. During this pandemic, the apex court has realized the importance of the situation, and suomotu passed guidelines[vii] for the functioning of the court via video conferencing. In contrast, conditions in Kashmir are so deplorable that only 1-2 percent of residents have fixed-line internet connectivity, and it is unfeasible for crores of Kashmiris to approach court via video-conferencing because of the aforementioned restriction on 4G networks. Excluding Kashmiris from the benefits of 4G technology during this crisis is unreasonable, illegal, and unconstitutional. · Freedom of Trade India’s economy was in trouble already because of several factors, COVID-19 has added nails to the coffin. This pandemic has severely affected every sector, but the most affected one is trade. The Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s head in an interview stated that due to internet shutdown following the abrogation of Article 370, the economy has crippled, and various businesses have suffered a loss of approximately USD 440 million in just three months.[viii] In this era, many trade activities depend only on the Internet. MHA, through its order[ix] issued under the Disaster Management Act, also advised ‘work from home’ as working places remain shut due to lockdown. However, this is not possible in the case of Kashmir due to restrictions in network speed. The guidelines[x] issued by MHA expressly stated internet services as ‘essential’ and should remain accessible. In Anuradha Bhasin, the Supreme Court has recognized the freedom of occupation, trade, and commerce through the Internet is protected under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Restricting internet speed deprives people of Kashmir to continue their trade through the Internet. Online meetings by corporates are proving worthwhile in India amid COVID-19, but on this aspect also, Kashmir is lagging due to the restrictions on internet speed. Thus, these restrictions are a clear case of violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. How far such restriction is plausible? Democracy is a symbol of the balance between powers of the State and citizen’s rights. Fundamental Rights reflects the “Idea of India” bestowed by framers of our Constitution. Following the above prophecy of the Constitution, protecting physical boundaries in the name of National Security is not the sole duty of government, but it also extends to confer and protect fundamental rights. It is a senseless act to protect only the body but not the soul of the citizens. By restricting the internet services to 2G, the government of J&K justified that such restrictions are necessary for protecting the sovereignty, integrity and security of the nation.[xi] However, it is pertinent to mention, that even after such restrictions, Kashmir has witnessed an increased number of terrorist and insurgent activities. The restrictions are further unjustified as conversations between such terror groups can happen even on 2G connections, and they can even use satellite communication technologies. Recently, the Apex Court in KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India[xii]upheld the ‘principle of proportionality’. It stated that restrictions on Fundamental Rights by the State must be proportionately determined after checking the arbitrariness. But in Kashmir, such restrictions have failed in the ‘proportionality test’ as restriction of internet services in the whole Union Territory and not only in affected areas. If the aim is to stop activities that are threatening national security, the government has the option to restrict internet services only in the areas posing high-risks, which can be ascertained by Special Agencies. Conclusion India has become the ‘internet shutdown capital’ of the world and accounts for more than 65% of the total internet shutdowns. Recently Kashmir witnessed the longest internet shutdown in history, which was lifted with the intervention of the Apex Court. However, such lifting of the shutdown is for namesake only, the residents of Kashmir still can’t enjoy the benefits of 4G services during this deadly crisis of COVID-19. The Supreme Court in Media Professionals has recognized the need to balance human rights with the security of the nation, but it has not done this itself, rather it has delegated this exercise to the executive, whose own orders were questioned in court. Now, the fate of poor Kashmir residents depends on how the Special Committee will balance the human rights on the verge of the so-called security threat to the nation. In either of the ways, the lives of the innocent Kashmiris are to be sacrificed. [i] 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1725. [ii] 2020 SCC OnLine SC 453. [iii] (1997) 2 SCC 83. [iv] Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Telemedicine Practice Guidelines (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.mohfw.gov.in/pdf/Telemedicine.pdf. [v] Special Correspondent, UGC issues advisory for new academic year, The Hindu (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ugc-issues-advisory-new-academic-year/article31466533.ece. [vi] (2016) 8 SCC 509. [vii] In Re: Guidelines for Court functioning through video conferencing during Covid-19 Pandemic, Suo Motu Writ (Civil) No.5/2020,https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/10853/10853_2020_0_1_21588_Judgement_06-Apr-2020.pdf. [viii] Regina Mihindukulasurya, How Kashmir internet shutdown has hit Valley industries hard, The Print (Oct. 29, 2019) https://theprint.in/india/kashmir-internet-shutdown-hit-valley-industries-hard/312659/. [ix] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Order No. 40-3/2020-DM-I(A) (May 17, 2020),https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/MHAOrderextension_1752020.pdf. [x] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Consolidated Guidelines respect to Order No. 40-3/2020-DM I(A) (May 17, 2020),https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/PR_Consolidated%20Guideline%20of%20MHA_28032020%20%281%29_1.PDF. [xi] Home Department, Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Temporary suspension of Telecom Services- directions Order No. 21(TSTS) of 2020 dated (Mar. 26, 2020), http://jkhome.nic.in/orders.html. [xii] (2019) 1 SCC 1. |
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